Allow yourself just for a moment to consider a new idea that is placed before you. On the surface it seems bereft of detail, however it does taste a lot like something you’ve seen before. As you look for a solution you trend towards searching in the ‘bucket-of-best-fit’; a labelled bucket of solutions which you’ve built from your years of experience with similar-tasting problems. This is normal. This is why we value experience. Let’s assume this new problem is similar enough to one you’ve previously seen that you continue to explore your ‘bucket-of-best-fit’ library of solutions looking for the perfect one, even though on some obscure level you acknowledge that this new problem may be immutably different, either in broad generality or precise and contextualised nuance, from anything you’ve encountered before. Maybe assume, perhaps worryingly, that you don’t have quite enough experience to recognise that this new problem is in fact, ‘different’ enough from anything you’ve experienced before that you’re looking in the totally wrong bucket. Maybe you cannot recognise that you do not even have an acceptable bucket to look in at all! With that in mind, what is the possibility that despite all the best intentions, that in trying to establish what a ‘space command’ in the ADF may look like we end up looking in the wrong bucket? Is it at all likely that with an expectation of predominately blue suits, an overwhelming technological nature and reliance on comforting words like ‘command’ and ‘operations’, we gravitate to familiar echelons like Air Force, Air Command, Special Operations Command and Joint Operations Command to learn from? Is there danger posed by the possibility that we could simply focus on the obvious similarities of similar-tasting problems, even though we feel that this problem is by its very nature, different? If we can accept that this premise is even just a possibility, then perhaps in-principle acceptance of some likely follow-on conclusions is not a stretch. These conclusions could of course include an appreciation that the force structures, training process, personnel management definitions and skillsets and operational chains of command required of a ‘Space Command’ may also be more dissimilar than similar to those we’ve seen elsewhere in the ADF. Of course there will be similarities; why wouldn’t there be when talking military force structures! But we must remain sensitive to when these similarities are outweighed in the decision-making calculus by the differences. Space Command will be a part of the ADF, so too will it’s leadership be a part of the wider ADF leadership. It’s operational strategies will be shaped by those of the wider DoD and Government. Undoubtedly a level of operational integration within existing ADF operational C2 arrangements will be required. And let’s be honest, the personnel and financial resources have to come from somewhere after all, and these are likely to be provided in large part by Air Force. But what if relying on this simple comparative language and looking to fiddle with the edges of a status quo to generate a credible and trusted military organisation, charged with operating in and through a physical domain that the ADF has no contested experience in, is folly? How would we find a solution? Firstly, we should acknowledge that the ADF has never contested the space domain before nor does it have the resources and pedigree of the United States Space Force to gain that experience in any sovereign way; any solution should take account of this. We must treat the domain (and its impact on ADF endeavour) on it’s own merits, free from pre-ordained solutions. Work out what strategic effects the ADF is to achieve in that domain at the behest of Government. Determine what capabilities are required to enact, prosecute and measure those effects, and then resource what we can and answer to Government for what we can’t. Design, train and support the workforce that would be required to operate those resourced capabilities. We should pay particular attention to defining and gaining the non-tangible skill sets and experiences the ADF does not have which are necessary to effectively operate in the contested space domain. We should do this rather than trying to shoehorn existing similar tasting capabilities, skills, and experience into a brand-new command simply because they are convenient and available. We should design this thing from the ground up, and refrain from looking in the bucket of Air Force hotdogs hoping to hit space sausage pay dirt.